Securing AI agents demands a new paradigm.
Every agent your teams run acts on the endpoint, so Certiv runs there too. Scroll to see what each layer of security reaches, and why Certiv sits where it does.
Opens the disc to show what the risk is and who covers it.
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| Layer | Approach | Catches |
|---|---|---|
| In the model | Provider | Jailbreak prompts; Harmful model output Leaves open: Different safety rules at each provider (Certiv: One rule set across providers); Protection that resets when you switch models (Certiv: Company rules stay the same across supported models) |
| On the network | Gateway | Jailbreak prompts; Harmful model output; Sensitive data sent to model APIs; Unapproved AI services Leaves open: Laptops off the corporate network (Certiv: Scout runs on the laptop, wherever it is); Agents not routed through the gateway (Certiv: Scout sees the agent’s own traffic and actions) |
| In the browser | Extension | Unapproved AI services; Data pasted into web AI chats Leaves open: Coding agents in a terminal (Certiv: Scout sees the agent on the endpoint) |
| Inside each agent | Hooks | One agent’s tool and MCP calls Leaves open: Agents with no hooks; Policy that resets when a team switches agents (Certiv: Company rules stay the same when the agent changes); Hooks the agent can switch off (Certiv: Rules run outside the agent, so its settings do not govern them); Hook coverage that differs by agent (Certiv: One rule set, the same answer in every supported agent); The same rule written again for every agent (Certiv: Written once, applied across supported agents); Audit records each agent keeps about itself (Certiv: One record outside the agent, across agents) |
| On the OS | EDR | Suspicious processes, after the fact |
| On the endpoint | Certiv | Jailbreak prompts; Harmful model output; Different safety rules at each provider; Protection that resets when you switch models; Sensitive data sent to model APIs; Unapproved AI services; Laptops off the corporate network; Agents not routed through the gateway; Data pasted into web AI chats; Coding agents in a terminal; One agent’s tool and MCP calls; Agents with no hooks; Policy that resets when a team switches agents; Hooks the agent can switch off; Hook coverage that differs by agent; The same rule written again for every agent; Audit records each agent keeps about itself; Suspicious processes, after the fact; Local model calls no gateway sees; Shell commands no proxy sees; CLI tools as the logged-in user; Agents with their own approvals off; Agents nobody knows are installed; Local model runtimes nobody knows about; Shadow automation across the fleet; Actions blocked in one agent, allowed in another; Destructive actions, before they run; Secrets leaving through chained tools; Prompt-injected actions; Actions that don’t match the request; Local models with no provider safeguards; Abliterated models; Models your policy has never seen; Agent “done” claims with no proof; Incidents with no record of what ran; Actions with no record of which agent acted |
| Certiv decision | Outside the agent | Agents with their own approvals off |
| Certiv decision | Discover every agent | Agents nobody knows are installed; Local model runtimes nobody knows about; Shadow automation across the fleet |
| Certiv decision | One company policy | Actions blocked in one agent, allowed in another |
| Certiv decision | Before execution | Destructive actions, before they run |
| Certiv decision | Judge the whole action | Secrets leaving through chained tools; Prompt-injected actions; Actions that don’t match the request |
| Certiv decision | Model-agnostic | Local models with no provider safeguards; Abliterated models; Models your policy has never seen |
| Certiv decision | Keep the record | Agent “done” claims with no proof; Incidents with no record of what ran; Actions with no record of which agent acted |