Coding agents

Certiv for Cursor

Your engineers already run it. It edits files, runs commands, and chains steps on their behalf. Certiv decides which of those actions are allowed, at the endpoint, before they execute.

In short

Cursor's agent takes real actions: running terminal commands, editing files across a repository, and calling tools. Certiv governs those actions from the endpoint, evaluating each one against enterprise policy before it runs, regardless of which model Cursor is pointed at.

What changes when the assistant becomes an agent

01

Agent mode acts, it does not suggest

Cursor’s agent runs terminal commands, edits files across the repo, and chains steps without a human approving each one. The unit of risk is no longer a code suggestion a developer accepts. It is an action already taken.

02

Rules files come from the repository

Cursor takes instruction from rules committed alongside the code. Any repository a developer opens can therefore influence how the agent behaves in it. Instructions that arrive with untrusted code deserve the same scrutiny as the code.

03

Codebase indexing widens the blast radius

To be useful, the agent reads broadly. Whatever a developer can reach on that machine (credentials in dotfiles, adjacent repos, mounted volumes) is reachable context for an agent working on their behalf.

04

Model choice is the developer’s

Cursor can be pointed at different models, including ones your gateway never sees. Governance that assumes a single sanctioned model route does not hold.

Governed at the endpoint, not the gateway

Certiv does not require a Cursor integration, an API, or a change to how your developers work. Scout runs on the machine where Cursor runs, and the Policy Engine evaluates each model request and tool call in context before it executes.

That placement is what makes coverage complete: it holds whichever model the developer selects, whether they are on the corporate network, and whatever the agent reaches for on disk.

Straight Answers

What Teams Ask About Securing Cursor

Expand to view common questions.

How does Certiv secure Cursor?
Certiv sits on the endpoint, in the execution path of the agent. Every model request and tool call Cursor makes is intercepted and evaluated against enterprise policy with full session context, then allowed, blocked, redirected, or escalated to a human before it executes. Certiv does not depend on a Cursor integration or API. It governs the actions the agent takes on the machine.
Do we have to turn off agent mode?
No, and turning it off is usually the wrong trade. Agent mode is why teams adopted Cursor. The goal is to let it run while the actions that would breach policy (touching production credentials, exfiltrating source, running a destructive command) are stopped before they execute. Certiv fails open by default, so the tool never becomes the reason engineering slows down.
What if a developer switches Cursor to a different model?
Coverage does not change. Certiv evaluates the actions an agent takes rather than the model behind it, and enforcement is endpoint-native rather than routed through a gateway. That includes local and open-weight models that generate no network traffic at all.
Does Certiv work alongside our existing controls?
Yes, and they compose cleanly. A gateway remains the control point for API key custody and model routing. Certiv covers what a gateway structurally cannot: local models, shadow agents, off-network users, and the endpoint context (files, shell, tools) behind every call.

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Local & open-weight models

When a developer points their agent at a model that never touches the network.